BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//132.216.98.100//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.20.4// BEGIN:VEVENT UID:20260523T215633EDT-1156vRPiUz@132.216.98.100 DTSTAMP:20260524T015633Z DESCRIPTION:Abstract\n\nAI systems of varying autonomy are increasingly emb edded in how we communicate\, create\, and make decisions across everyday and professional domains. While these technologies offer transformative po tential\, they also introduce novel sociotechnical harms\, posing safety r isks that differ from those in traditional safety-critical domains. Buildi ng on insights from the field of safety engineering\, human-computer inter action\, and science and technology studies\, this thesis argues that such harms cannot be fully understood or mitigated through model-level interve ntions alone. They must be addressed at the system level by examining how AI systems are developed and integrated within broader sociotechnical cont exts. System safety\, as part of a new generation of safety engineering ap proaches\, offers a valuable lens for understanding safety as an emergent property of complex sociotechnical systems. However\, its approaches have yet to be meaningfully adapted to the context of AI\, where new forms of c omplexity and risk demand both translation and expansion. This thesis addr esses that gap by operationalizing system safety for AI\, developing actio nable approaches for responsible development\, evaluation\, and use of AI systems across their lifecycle.\n\n \n\nUsing a mixed-methods approach\, t his thesis examines three critical dimensions for establishing AI system s afety practices. First\, at the organizational and compliance level\, we i dentify that existing practices for managing risks from AI systems are ad hoc and fragmented. To address this\, we translate hazard analysis framewo rks from system safety\, particularly STPA\, to support practitioners in i dentifying and mitigating potential hazards early in the AI system develop ment process. We demonstrate that our adaptation of STPA offers key afford ances for risk management by tracing how sociotechnical harms can emerge f rom the interactions among technical components\, organizational processes \, and institutional decision-making. Notably\, mitigating these hazards a nd harms requires adequate evaluation and monitoring. Second\, at the deve loper and evaluation level\, we find that current measurements of ethical AI principles tend to focus on model-level metrics and a narrow subset of harms. Using a system safety lens\, we trace links between these measures\ , the attributes they assess\, and the types of hazards and harms they sig nal. This mapping clarifies which hazards and harms are addressed or overl ooked\, supporting the design of evaluation measures that serve as more in tentional feedback mechanisms for system-level safety. Regardless of all m itigation strategies\, AI systems will have erroneous and inappropriate ou tputs. To understand how users respond when this happens\, the third dimen sion focuses on the user level. In a controlled experiment involving AI-ba sed writing assistants\, we investigate the relationship between different types of mental models and user control over AI systems. We find that whi le users with more in-depth mental models—those involving how the system w orks—find the tool easier to use\, they do not necessarily demonstrate mor e effective control over the system\, particularly when the AI generates e rroneous suggestions. This highlights the importance of designing human-AI interactions that not only support user understanding but also enable use rs to translate that understanding into effective responses when failures arise.\n\n \n\nTogether\, these contributions establish a foundation for o perationalizing AI system safety across key points of intervention\, hazar d mapping\, system evaluations\, and end-user interaction\, and offer a fo rward-looking lens for unpacking what safety will require as we move towar ds increasingly autonomous AI systems embedded in society.\n DTSTART:20250812T140000Z DTEND:20250812T160000Z LOCATION:Room 603\, McConnell Engineering Building\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H 3A 0E9\, 3480 rue University SUMMARY:PhD defence of Shalaleh Rismani – Built In\, Not Bolted On: Operati onalizing System Safety for AI URL:/ece/channels/event/phd-defence-shalaleh-rismani-b uilt-not-bolted-operationalizing-system-safety-ai-366243 END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR